Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Volume 20

Issue 2

Article 4

2015

Reward the Stalking Horse or Preserve the Estate: Determining
the Appropriate Standard of Review for Awarding Break-Up Fees
in § 363 Sales
Zachary R. Frimet

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl

Recommended Citation
Zachary R. Frimet, Reward the Stalking Horse or Preserve the Estate: Determining the Appropriate
Standard of Review for Awarding Break-Up Fees in § 363 Sales, 20 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 461 (2015).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl/vol20/iss2/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law by an authorized editor
of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Reward the Stalking Horse or Preserve the Estate: Determining the Appropriate
Standard of Review for Awarding Break-Up Fees in § 363 Sales
Cover Page Footnote
J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law; B.B.A., Goizueta Business School, Emory University.
The author would like to thank his parents, Rhett and Andrea Frimet, and his brother, Jake Frimet, for their
unwavering support.

This note is available in Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl/vol20/iss2/
4

VOLUME XX

2015

NUMBER 2

FORDHAM
JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

REWARD THE STALKING HORSE OR PRESERVE THE ESTATE:
DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR
AWARDING BREAK-UP FEES IN § 363 SALES
Zachary R. Frimet

REWARD THE STALKING HORSE OR PRESERVE
THE ESTATE: DETERMINING THE
APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR
AWARDING BREAK-UP FEES IN § 363 SALES
Zachary R. Frimet*
ABSTRACT
Following the surge of bankruptcies in the wake of the Great
Recession, a growing and somewhat controversial trend has emerged
whereby companies seeking to purchase a debtor’s assets in
bankruptcy frequently make use of Section 363 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code (“§ 363”). In general, § 363 sales are
accomplished via public auction. This aspect of § 363 exposes initial
bidders, known in bankruptcy as “stalking horse bidders,” to the risk
that they will commit time and resources in pursuit of the acquisition
and yet fail to succeed as the prevailing bidder. To hedge against this
risk, stalking horse bidders frequently request “break-up fees” when
negotiating a purchase agreement for a § 363 sale. There is no
consensus among the Bankruptcy Courts as to how to treat break-up
fee provisions. Thus, the foundation of this Note is that the lack of a
uniform break-up fee standard is detrimental to the consistency of
bankruptcy law and leaves debtors and stalking horse bidders on
unstable ground when utilizing § 363.
Courts predominantly use three standards when reviewing a breakup fee provision in a § 363 asset sale: the business judgment
standard, the best interests of the estate test, and the administrative
expense test. Because all bankruptcy law is, at its core, based in
principles of equity, it only makes sense to develop a theory of
break-up fees based upon the philosophies underlying the law’s
procedures. As such, this Note analyzes break-up fees with a view
toward the purpose of § 363 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Using that
perspective, this Note argues in favor of using the best interests of
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the estate test when determining whether to award break-up fees to
stalking horse bidders in § 363 sales.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the United States has seen a significant increase in
the number of distressed companies seeking to liquidate assets. 1 To
complete this objective in bankruptcy, many companies make use of §
363 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes debtors to
sell assets outside “the ordinary course of business.” 2 This statute
1. Corinne Ball & John K. Kane, How to Handle Corporate Distress Sale
Transactions, in ALI-ABA Business Law Course Materials Journal 38723 (2003),
available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/7fbdc211-d634-4ae3-83776fbe2cd6a0e5/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/dd598749-67d2-455f-997f9598c2e05623/ALI_ABA_KANE.pdf.
2. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012); see Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC
(In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that § 363 sales “may
well replace the main route of Chapter 11 reorganization plans”) (quotations omitted)
(citation omitted).
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permits debtors to sell assets free and clear of all liabilities and protects
good faith purchasers from fraudulent transfer claims.3 In this regard, §
363 provides for an orderly process by which bankrupt companies can
maximize the resale value of their assets, while offering protections to
buyers that make these distressed acquisitions very enticing to outside
investors.4
Alas, it is not always smooth sailing for § 363 purchasers.5 More
often than not, a debtor sells its assets via public auction in order to
maximize the sale price.6 Consequently, a potential purchaser exposes
itself to the risk that it will commit valuable resources to pursue the
acquisition yet ultimately fail to consummate the sale.7 This risk has led
these proverbial stalking horse8 bidders to negotiate bidding incentives
to hedge against their back-end risks. 9 Taking cues from traditional
acquisition practice, a stalking horse bidder frequently requests break-up
fees when negotiating a purchase agreement in a § 363 sale.10 A “breakup fee” is a sum paid to the stalking horse bidder in the event that the
stalking horse does not finalize the sale.11 Judicial treatment of break-up
fees in traditional corporate combinations12 has been deferential to the
3.
4.

See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012); id. § 363(m) (2012).
Andrew S. Brown, Breaking Up and Making Out (Rich): Recommendations for
Revision of Bankruptcy Code Provisions Governing Break-Up Fees Used by Stalking
Horse Bidders in § 363 Bankruptcy Asset Sales, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 1463, 1465 (2010)
(noting that the protections of § 363 “encourage private equity funds to venture into the
bankruptcy court system and acquire bankrupt companies in whole or in part”).
5. See infra Part I.
6. See Ball & Kane, supra note 1, at 395 (“The objective of the auction process is
to obtain the ‘highest and best’ offer for the assets, thus maximizing the proceeds to the
estate and, indirectly, the seller’s creditors.”).
7. See Nicholas M. McGrath, Breaking Down Break-Up Fees: The Appropriate
Standard, 2011 Ann. Surv. of Bankr. Law 14, n.40-44 and text (2011) (“Cognizant of . .
. the fact that the debtor is free to ‘window shop’ the asset, the stalking horse has a
realistic concern that its time, expenses, and efforts may be wasted, or worse, utilized
by a competitive bidder without any ‘assurance’ that it will ultimately be successful in
acquiring the assets.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
8. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
9. See McGrath, supra note 7, n.7-11 and text.
10. See infra Part II.A-B.
11. Peter C. Blain, Let’s Make a Deal: Sales of Distressed Businesses in Insolvency
Proceedings, in Buying and Selling Distressed Businesses 137 (2010), available at
2010 WL 6425211, at 9.
12. “Corporate Combinations” refers to a corporate mergers or acquisitions.
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parties of the deal.13 Courts routinely approve negotiated break-up fees
in challenged transactions. 14 In the context of bankruptcy, however,
courts and scholars have not universally agreed upon the legitimacy of
break-up fees. Contrary to most procedural aspects of bankruptcy law, a
field in which almost everything is codified, determining the appropriate
standard of review for break-up fees in § 363 sales has been left entirely
to the discretion of the courts.15 As such, debate over the advantages,
disadvantages, and necessity of break-up fees has led courts in different
directions when deciding whether to award these fees to the stalking
horse.16 The issue is inextricably linked to one of bankruptcy’s central
purposes, the maximization of the value of the debtor’s estate.17
Courts predominantly use three standards when reviewing a breakup fee provision in a § 363 asset sale: the business judgment standard,

13. See Mark F. Hebbeln, The Economic Case for Judicial Deference to Break-Up
Fee Agreements in Bankruptcy, 13 Bankr. Dev. J. 475, 478-79 (1997) (noting that
“[o]utside bankruptcy, break-up fee agreements are presumptively valid under the
business judgment rule” and that a decision protected by the business judgment rule can
only be challenged on the basis of “bad faith, negligence, or self-dealing”).
14. Id. at 480-81; see e.g., In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig.,
2011 WL 2028076, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011), as revised (May 24, 2011)
(denying a plaintiff’s challenge to a termination fee, where the fee “appear[ed] to have
resulted from good faith, arm’s-length negotiations”); In re Bear Stearns Litig., 870
N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (protecting a board of directors decision to approve a
merger agreement that contained, inter alia, a “termination fee”, under the business
judgment rule); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 119 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant corporation with respect to the
plaintiff shareholders challenge of certain deal protection provisions in a merger
agreement, including a termination fee).
15. See Bruce A. Markell, The Case Against Breakup Fees in Bankruptcy, 66 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 349, 353 (1992) (noting that, In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs. L.P., 96 B.R. 24,
29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), the first reported case to deal directly with break-up fees,
used principles of corporate law to determine whether the break-up fee in question was
valid).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy in the United States, 96 Com. L.J.
160, 160 (1991) (noting that one of the primary objectives of “all bankruptcy law” is
“to prevent on the part of the insolvent debtor conduct detrimental to the interests of
[its] creditors”); see, e.g., Matter of Midway Airlines, Inc., 6 F.3d 492, 494 (7th Cir.
1993) (noting that “one of the Code’s central purposes” is “the maximization of the
value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of creditors”).
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the best interests of the estate test, and the administrative expense test.18
Thus, at the outset it is imperative that courts come to a consensus with
respect to an appropriate standard of review. Congress designed the
Bankruptcy Code19 to provide a uniform framework under which entities
can operate while insolvent. 20 The lack of a uniform break-up fee
standard is detrimental to that principle and leaves debtors and stalking
horse bidders in a precarious position.21
Courts and scholars advocating for a particular standard have used
statistical analysis, economic theory, and principles of law to defend
their respective positions. However, few have analyzed this issue in a
manner that goes beyond the general purpose of bankruptcy law and
toward the specific nuances of Chapter 11.22 Since bankruptcy law, at its
core, is based in principles of equity, it only makes sense to develop a
theory of break-up fees based in the philosophies underlying its
procedures. Therefore, this Note does not arrive at its position via
empirical evidence, but rather, its conclusion is based on an overview of
the shifting function of § 363 sales in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.23
This Note argues in favor of using the best interests of the estate
test when determining whether to award break-up fees to stalking horse
bidders in § 363 sales. Part I begins with a brief overview of § 363 sales
in bankruptcy, focusing specifically on the role of the stalking horse
bidder. Part II discusses break-up fees and the three main standards that
bankruptcy courts use when determining whether to award break-up fees
to a stalking horse bidder. Finally, Part III argues in favor of the best
interests of the estate test as the appropriate standard of review, which

18. 2 William L. Norton, Jr., Norton Bankruptcy Law & Practice § 44:27 (3d ed.
2010).
19. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2012) (containing the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code).
20. See Maryland Port Admin. v. Premier Auto. Services, Inc. (In re Premier Auto.
Servs., Inc.), 492 F.3d 274, 284 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The purpose of Chapter 11
reorganization is to assist financially distressed business enterprises by providing them
with breathing space in which to return to a viable state.”) (quotations omitted)
(citations omitted).
21. See infra Part II.
22. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2012) (containing the provisions of
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code).
23. See infra Part III.
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represents a strong middle ground between the three approaches and is
implicated by § 363’s role in modern Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
I. § 363 SALES AND THE STALKING HORSE BIDDER
A debtor can pursue two avenues when selling significant assets of
its business in bankruptcy. 24 The debtor can use § 1123 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which involves the oft lengthy process of developing
a plan of reorganization and having it confirmed by the court. 25
Alternatively, the debtor can use § 363(b), which permits the debtor to
sell assets outside of the ordinary course of business subject to the
procedures set forth in the Bankruptcy Code.26 Typically, § 363 sales
happen fast and via public auction, and therefore are more prone to
being targeted by distressed asset investors.27 Consequently, the issue of
break-up fees is far more prevalent in the context of § 363 sales as
opposed to plan sales.28 This part discusses § 363 sales and the role of
the stalking horse bidder in § 363 sales conducted via public auction.
A. § 363 SALES: AN OVERVIEW
In the modern bankruptcy world many debtors opt to sell assets via
§ 363 as opposed to a traditional Chapter 11 plan.29 Section 363 permits

24. See Rakhee V. Patel & Vickie L. Driver, Toto, I’ve A Feeling We’re Not in
Kansas Anymore: Bankruptcy Sales Outside the Ordinary Course of Business, 57 Fed.
Law. 56, 56 (2010) (discussing § 1123 versus § 363 for sales outside of the ordinary
course of business).
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2012).
26. See id. § 363.
27. See Elizabeth B. Rose, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(B): The Opportunity for
Sweetheart Deals Without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 249, 269
(2006) (noting that “the number of § 363 preplan sale motions for all or substantially all
of the debtor’s assets dramatically increased in the 1990s and preplan sales enjoy even
more use since 2000”).
28. See Kimberly W. Osenbaugh & David C. Neu, Asset Sales in Bankruptcy
Break-Up Fees and Topping Fees, SJ076 ALI-ABA 829, 832 (2004) (noting that breakup fees are often requested in § 363 sales as opposed to 1123 plans because “[s]ales of
assets pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code are often conducted pursuant to
sophisticated bidding procedures”).
29. Jacob A. Kling, Rethinking 363 Sales, 17 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 258, 262
(2012) (noting the trend toward § 363 sales, and proffering that two possible
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a debtor to sell assets outside the ordinary course of business, prior to a
confirmed plan of reorganization, following notice and hearing, and
upon approval of the court. 30 The shift from a traditional Chapter 11
case, one which would have the debtor’s assets disposed pursuant to a
confirmed plan of reorganization, to § 363 sales, “has been driven by
efficiency, from the perspectives of sellers and buyers alike.” 31 A
significant impetus for this trend is the speed of a § 363 sale, which “can
maximize asset value by sale of the debtor’s business as a going
concern.”32 In addition, § 363 sales tend to enhance the purchase price of
the distressed asset because they are sold to the purchaser free and clear
of all liens, claims, and liabilities under § 363(f). 33 Furthermore, §
363(m) limits the ability to appeal a § 363 sale to a “good faith”
purchaser.34 These two provisions, “provide a degree of finality to the
sale that is very appealing to prospective purchasers.” 35 As a result,
debtors are able to receive a higher price for the sale as buyers jump on
the opportunity to receive distressed assets at a discount while receiving
the protections of the Bankruptcy Code.36
Recently, “it has become more commonplace for debtors to hold §
363 sales with the purpose of selling substantially all of their assets.”37
In effect, bankrupt corporations are using § 363 as a way of selling their
businesses while foregoing the traditional Chapter 11 process.38 Debtors
can execute § 363 sales by private or public auction,39 although, in order
explanations are: “that a 363 sale can be accomplished more quickly and at less cost
than a full blown reorganization . . . [,] [and] assets have become less firm specific; as a
result, a firm’s going concern surplus can generally be preserved as effectively through
a 363 sale as through a reorganization”).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012).
31. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d
108, 115 (2d Cir. 2009) vacated on other grounds In re Chrysler, LLC, 592 F.3d 370
(2d Cir. 2010).
32. Id.
33. See id. at 115-16; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m).
35. Douglas E. Deutsch & Michael G. Distefano, The Mechanics of A Section §
363 Sale, 30-FEB Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 48, 48 (2011).
36. Kling, supra note 29, at 263 (noting the functions of a § 363 sale to “offer an
important and efficient mechanism to maximize the value of the estate”).
37. Deutsch & Distefano, supra note 35, at 48 (emphasis in original).
38. Id.
39. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004f)(1).
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to maximize value for the estate, major assets are rarely sold at private
auctions.40 Generally, sale through public auction involves selecting an
initial bidder to begin the process and then sending the sale to auction
where competing bidders can drive up the sale price. 41 The role,
necessity, and treatment of the initial bidder in § 363 sales have become
increasingly debated topics in bankruptcy.42
B. THE STALKING HORSE BIDDER
The initial bidder plays an important role in the § 363 sale
process. 43 This bidder will negotiate the purchase agreement with the
debtor, and the debtor will ultimately use that purchase agreement as the
vehicle through which the sale will be consummated at auction. 44 In
bankruptcy, practitioners typically refer to the initial bidder as the
stalking horse bidder.45 The term “stalking horse” refers to a tactic used
in hunting whereby a hunter conceals himself behind an image of a

40. Harvey R. Miller, John J. Rapisardi, & Reginald A. Greene, Leaving Old
Questions Unanswered and Raising New Ones: The Supreme Court Furthers the New
Value Controversy in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North
Lasalle Street Partnership, 30 U. Mem. L. Rev. 553, 565 (2000) (noting that “major
assets are rarely sold at private auctions”).
41. See Deutsch & Distefano, supra note 35, at 49 (noting that “[t]he first step of a
§ 363 sale is often for the debtor to identify a ‘stalking horse’ bidder” who will
establish the floor price of the assets, “which can be shopped around to other potential
bidders”).
42. See, e.g., Oscar Garza, Jesse S. Finlayson, & Solmaz Hamidian, Rethinking the
Scope of the O’Brien Decision: Why the Third Circuit’s Administrative Claims Analysis
Should Not Be Applied to the Debtor’s Request for Approval of A Breakup Fee in
Connection with Bankruptcy Sales in Chapter 11 Cases, 28 Cal. Bankr. J. 1, 2 (2005)
(criticizing the Third Circuit’s use of the administrative expense test to review a breakup fee); see e.g., Markell, supra note 15 (arguing against allowing break-up fees in
bankruptcy).
43. See Blain, supra note 11, at 8 (“While some sales proceed as ‘naked auctions’
with no stalking horse bids, these are relatively rare.”).
44. See generally Sharon Alexander, Bankruptcy Sales: The Stalking Horse, JONES
DAY, Nov. 2003, at 2-3, available at http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/
pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S2177 (explaining bidding procedures and describing
incentives for the stalking horse).
45. David H. Kleiman, Alternatives for Awarding Break-Up Fees to StalkingHorse Bidders, 29-OCT Am. Bankr. Inst. J., 26, 26 (2010) (citation omitted).
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horse in order to get closer to his target.46 Analogously, the debtor in a §
363 sale uses the stalking horse bidder to stimulate the bidding process
and draw other bidders into the sale. 47 The stalking horse performs
extensive due diligence and typically drafts the asset purchase
agreement used to consummate the sale.48 Ultimately, the stalking horse
sets the floor for the deal by determining the value of the debtor’s
assets.49 During this process, the stalking horse will generally expend far
more resources than other bidders when trying to secure the deal
because subsequent bidders can rely on the stalking horse’s due
diligence when crafting their own bids.50
It may seem unlikely that a purchaser would volunteer to serve as a
stalking horse given the nature of the job. 51 Nevertheless, there are
several reasons why a potential purchaser would assume the role.52 First,
the role of the stalking horse puts the potential purchaser in the best
position to structure a favorable deal. 53 In addition to developing the
financial terms of the purchase agreement, the stalking horse can also
negotiate favorable bidding procedures that will enhance its ability to
close the sale.54 Second, oftentimes a debtor will offer certain bidding
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Alexander, supra note 44, at 2.
Id.
Blain, supra note 11, at 10.
See Brown, supra note 4, at 1465 (discussing the issues a stalking horse bidder
faces when setting the floor for a deal).
50. Monica E. White, Give Me A Break-Up Fee: In Re Reliant Energy
Channelview LP and the Third Circuit’s Improper Rejection of a Bankruptcy Bid
Protection Provision, 48 Hous. L. Rev. 659, 668 (2011) (noting that subsequent bidders
can rely on the stalking horse’s due diligence and therefore incur less costs).
51. See Alexander, supra note 44, at 1 (noting that “[p]otential purchasers may be
reluctant to the take on the role of the stalking horse” given that the “initial bidder
typically has to expend greater resources than other bidders in negotiating the deal,
performing due diligence, and otherwise setting the ‘floor’ for the terms of the
transaction).
52. See Osenbaugh & Neu, supra note 28, at 833-36 (discussing the variety of
reasons why a potential purchaser would agree to become the stalking horse).
53. See Blain, supra note 11, at 9 (“Another significant benefit available to the
stalking horse bidder is the ability to influence the sale process. . . . By custom, the
stalking horse bidder usually drafts the asset purchase agreement used in connection
with the transaction. . . . A stalking horse bidder that may be willing to assume various
contracts or exclude certain assets may be able to craft an asset purchase agreement that
gives it a competitive advantage over other buyers.”).
54. See Alexander, supra note 44, at 2.
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incentives to solicit a potential purchaser to become the stalking horse.55
Two of the most common compensatory bidding incentives are expense
reimbursements and break-up fees. 56 Under expense reimbursement
arrangements, the debtor will reimburse the stalking horse for
reasonable fees incurred with respect to the stalking horse’s due
diligence.57 The amount and timing of the reimbursement will generally
be limited in order to ensure that the bankruptcy court does not perceive
it as an unreasonable drain on the debtor’s estate.58 Break-up fees, on the
other hand, represent compensation paid to the stalking horse unrelated
to any costs incurred.59 This distinction has led to courts and scholars
disagreeing as to how to classify and analyze break-up fees in
bankruptcy.60
II. BREAK-UP FEES
In its most basic form, a break-up fee is a predetermined amount
payable to one party if an agreed upon transaction with another party
fails to close.61 In an auction context, a break-up fee compensates an
unsuccessful bidder through a payment that goes beyond covering the

55. See Blain, supra note 11, at 9 (“[U]sually a number of interested parties
vigorously seek to become the stalking horse because of the significant benefits that
flow from that status.”).
56. Id. (“Among the most significant benefits that accrue to the stalking horse is
the ability to receive a break-up fee and/or reimbursement of expenses.”).
57. Id. (“Expense reimbursement is the reimbursement of actual expenses the
stalking horse can prove it expended in connection with the transaction.”).
58. See Alexander, supra note 44, at 2 (commenting that bidding incentives often
include “expense reimbursements, break-up fees, favorable bidding procedures, and
exclusivity arrangements”).
59. See Blain, supra note 11, at 9 (“A true break-up fee is a fixed number paid if
the stalking horse is not the successful bidder, without regard to the actual expenses
incurred by the stalking horse.”).
60. See e.g., Markell, supra note 15. Compare In re Reliant Energy Channelview
LP, 594 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2010) (analyzing the break-up fee using the
administrative expense standard) with In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. 98 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1995) (analyzing the break-up fee using the best interests of the estate test).
61. Simon M. Lorne & Joey Marlene Bryan, Acquisitions and Mergers: Negotiated
and Contested Transactions, in 11 Acquisitions & Mergers § 3:62 (2014).
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bidder’s pre-sale expenses.62 In a simple scenario, one company makes
an offer to buy a target entity, and the offer is accepted. 63 The two
entities finalize “the terms of the acquisition, but prior to the closing of
the transaction, a third company offers a higher offer for the target
company” that the target company ultimately accepts.64 In this scenario,
the original offeror has taken the time to set up the deal yet ends up
receiving nothing in return. To mitigate this risk, the initial bidder will
request that the target entity stipulate to pay a fee to the initial bidder in
the event that the transaction is not consummated.65 This way, the initial
bidder guarantees itself compensation for the resources expended while
valuing the target entity and formulating an appropriate offer.66 Given
the modern propensity for strategic acquisitions both in and out of
bankruptcy, the issue of break-up fees has become a frequent topic of
debate among courts and scholars.67
A. NON-BANKRUPTCY BREAK-UP FEES
Judicial examination of break-up fees first developed in nonbankruptcy law. 68 Parties often negotiate break-up fees as part of
corporate merger and acquisition transactions. 69 When considering a
potential merger or acquisition, the acquiring company will spend “time,
effort, and capital in order to determine such factors as corporate
compatibility and economic feasibility.”70 Given the complexity of many
62. Brown, supra note 4, at 1465 (“The break-up fee compensates the unsuccessful
initial bidder through a fee greater than the initial bidder’s actual due diligence
expenses.”).
63. Ely R. Levy, Corporate Courtship Gone Sour: Applying a Bankruptcy
Approach to Termination Fee Provisions in Merger and Acquisition Agreements, 30
Hofstra L. Rev. 1361, 1366-67 (2002).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1367.
66. Id. at 1366 (noting that initial bidders spend “a great deal of time and capital in
the process of appraising the target entity for the purpose of formulating an accurate bid
or offer”).
67. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
68. See McGrath, supra note 7, at n.17 (“The concept of a break-up fee in a section
363 sale originally derives from non-bankruptcy case law.”).
69. Id. (commenting that “break-up fees are routinely seen in acquisition
transactions throughout the corporate world”).
70. Levy, supra note 63, at 1402.
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of these transactions, the initial bidder may end up investing substantial
financial resources toward due diligence efforts and preparation of its
offer or bid. 71 In addition to the considerable up-front costs, the
competitive nature of the modern corporate landscape further increases
the risk to the potential bidder.72 Making matters more challenging for
the parties in interest is the requirement that corporate shareholders
approve most major corporate combinations.73 Because shareholders in
public companies are often numerous and widely dispersed, this
approval requirement can significantly delay the closing of the
transaction. 74 This allows competitors time to use the information
gathered by the initial bidder and make a competing bid with potentially
better terms.75 The initial bidder may end up losing out on the deal if the
shareholders approve an alternative offer, 76 leaving the bidder
uncompensated for the tremendous costs of investigating the
transaction. 77 In addition to the sunk costs, the bidder incurs the
opportunity cost of not profiting from another strategic merger.78
The increasing trend of corporate combination transactions 79
coupled with the substantial risk of losing a deal to a rival bidder80 have
caused break-up fees to become a commonplace deal provision in

71.
72.

See id.
See Levy, supra note 63, at 1370 n.47 (noting that “in the current merger
landscape, large corporations have been using mergers to gain advantage within their
industries”) (citing Constance L. Hays, Unilever Deal for Bestfoods Signals More
Acquisitions, N.Y. Times, June 7, 2000, at C1).
73. See Markell, supra note 15, at 353 (“Acquirers often ask for breakup fees due
to the requirement that corporate shareholders must approve most major corporate
combinations.”).
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 353 (concluding that, in effect, “the breakup fee is designed . . . to
compensate for the risk of losing a [finished] deal”).
79. See Richard G. Parker & David A. Balto, The Merger Wave: Trends in Merger
Enforcement and Litigation, 55 Bus. Law. 351, 356 (1999) (noting this trend).
80. See Levy, supra note 63, at 1370 n.51 (noting that second bidders prevailed in
75% of the forty-eight acquisition cases examined) (citing Richard S. Ruback,
Assessing Competition in the Market for Corporate Acquisitions, 11 J. Part Fin. Econ.
141, 147 (1983)).
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corporate merger and acquisition deals.81 As with many issues that arise
in corporate law, courts evaluate break-up fees under the “business
judgment rule.” 82 The business judgment rule operates under the
“presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”83
As discussed infra, judicial scrutiny under the business judgment rule
differs slightly between the corporate and bankruptcy contexts, yet the
overarching premise is the same.84 The rule requires courts to defer to
the business judgment of corporate directors regarding the affairs of the
corporate enterprise. 85 Under the rule, courts will not interfere with
decisions that fall within corporate directors’ discretion in the absence of
bad faith, negligence, or self-dealing.86 It is important to note, however,
that some courts consider additional factors when analyzing the
legitimacy of break-up fees in corporate combinations, namely, whether
the break-up fee “enhance[s] rather than stop[s] bidding.” 87 This
addition to the otherwise relatively unmodified use of the business

81. See id. at 1363 n.16 (“[T]here’s little debate these days over break-up fees.
When lawyers sit down to negotiate, everyone at the table pretty much knows what’s
going to happen . . . Every buyer expects to get it, and every seller expects for it to be
asked for.”) (citation omitted).
82. See, e.g., Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 574-75 (11th Cir.
1988); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 277 (2d Cir.
1986) (using the business judgment rule to evaluate a target corporation’s assent to a
break-up fee provision in the acquisition agreement).
83. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)), overruled on other grounds
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
84. See infra Part II.
85. 3A Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corp. § 1036 (2014).
86. See Hebbeln, supra note 13, at 479 (“A plaintiff challenging the business
judgment of the board of directors bears the burden of proving bad faith, negligence, or
self-dealing.”) (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)), overruled
by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
87. See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 683 F.Supp. 422, 440 (noting
in its analysis that break-up fees in corporate combinations “are not illegal where they
enhance rather than chill bidding”); see also, e.g., Samjens Partners I v. Burlington
Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“In coordinating the bidding
process, the board can institute strategies, such as . . . a break-up fee . . . but only if their
strategies enhance the bidding.”).
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judgment rule highlights the controversial nature of break-up fees as
they apply to judicially reviewable transactions.88
B. BREAK-UP FEES IN BANKRUPTCY
Despite break-up fees’ relatively new role in asset purchases in
bankruptcy, they have come to the forefront of judicial debate, and for
good reason.89 Procedurally, break-up fees in bankruptcy are similar to
their corporate counterparts. 90 The fees are a payment made by the
debtor to the proposed purchaser “in the event that the transaction
contemplated fails to be consummated for various reasons delineated in
the purchase agreement, including the [debtor’s] acceptance of a later
bid.”91 Although similar in structure, break-up fees in bankruptcy asset
sales, particularly § 363 sales, are far more nuanced than those that
occur in corporate combinations.92
The reasons why a potential § 363 purchaser would insist on breakup fees are similar to the reasons traditionally used to justify break-up
fees in corporate combinations, although potential purchasers arguably
have even more incentive to pursue break-up fees in bankruptcy, given
the heightened stakes. 93 As in corporate combinations, the potential
purchaser will incur many expenses in negotiating the sale.94 However,
because the subjects of § 363 transactions are distressed assets,
oftentimes initial bidders will spend more time and money conducting
due diligence as compared to a non-distressed acquisition. 95 Broadly
speaking, the debtor’s distressed situation may have encouraged its
88.
89.

See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
See Markell, supra note 15, at 354 (discussing the first reported bankruptcy
case to address the issue of break-up fees, In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs. L.P., 96 B.R. 24
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
90. See Levy, supra note 63, at 1390 (“While termination fee provisions originated
in the context of corporate mergers and acquisitions, such fees are included in
bankruptcy asset purchase agreements.”).
91. In re APP Plus, Inc., 223 B.R. 870, 874 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998).
92. See infra notes 192-199 and accompanying text.
93. See Hebbeln, supra note 13, at 494 (“When a firm makes a decision to invest
time and money in one project, it must forgo another because the firm’s resources are
limited and it cannot invest in everything it might like.”).
94. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
95. Brown, supra note 4, at 1480 (“Initial bidders argue that they need [break-up
fees] in order to justify researching and bidding for risky bankrupt companies.”).
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management to take aggressive or atypical measures, particularly with
regard to the business’ working capital, expenditures, and
maintenance.96 As opposed to a healthy corporate combination, in which
a buyer may want to purchase the target entity as a going concern, a
distressed situation encourages buyers to sift through the debtor’s assets
and choose the ones most likely to be profitable in the future.97 From a
contractual standpoint, the seller will be unlikely or unable to stipulate
to post-closing indemnifications for the buyer with respect to breaches
of representations and warranties.98 As such, thorough due diligence will
be critical for the buyer in order to formulate an offer that corresponds
with these post-closing risks.
In addition, a sensible initial bidder must always be concerned that
the debtor will use the first bid as a stalking horse to attract other
bidders.99 During the time it takes to garner court approval of the sale,
the stalking horse runs the risk that a competing bidder will use the due
diligence conducted by the stalking horse, make a superior bid, and win
court approval.100 Making matters more difficult for the stalking horse is
the fact that creditors can legitimately object to a § 363 sale if there is a
higher or better offer.101 The considerable uncertainty as to whether the
initial bidder will ultimately close the § 363 sale combined with the risks

96. See Ball & Kane, supra note 1, at 31 (noting that “the”[t]he seller’s distressed
situation may have caused its management to take aggressive or unusual measures in
operating the business, such as using working capital in peculiar ways or deferring
maintenance or capital expenditures”).
97. See Corinne Ball & John K. Kane, A Practical Guide to Distress M&A (Part
2), 6 M & A Law, no. 7-8, 2003 at 1, 6, available at http://www.jonesday.com/
files/Publication/7caf39ca-b5af-4018-8005-a438b96635c9/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/021f5fce-5fac-422d-8230-7e08207af727/GuideToDistress.pdf
(“Unlike a conventional M&A transaction, in which a buyer may be pressured to buy a
particular business or company as a going concern, warts and all, a distress situation
may permit buyers to pick and choose assets, liabilities and contractual obligations.”).
98. See id. (noting that “post-closing indemnification for breaches of
representations and warranties will not be available” and thus are unlikely to occur in
Chapter 11 sales). In addition, if a debtor sells all or substantially all of its assets it will
generally end all operations and cease to exist upon consummation of the Chapter 11
proceeding. Consequently, there often may not be a post-closing entity from which the
buyer can be reimbursed.
99. See McGrath, supra note 7, at n.8-9 and accompanying text.
100. Id. at n.3 and accompanying text.
101. Id. at n.156 and accompanying text.
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inherent to the acquisition of distressed assets strongly encourages
potential § 363 bidders to seek break-up fees.
While it seems as though only a stalking horse bidder would pursue
break-up fees when entering into a § 363 sale, many scholars and courts
argue that break-up fees are useful for the bankrupt entity as well.102
There are a variety of legitimate reasons why a debtor would stipulate to
a break-up fee.103 First, the break-up fee can serve to attract an initial
bid. 104 Without the promise of guaranteed compensation, a potential
purchaser may be hesitant to conduct the due diligence required to value
the bankrupt company properly. 105 As a corollary, the assurance of a
break-up fee may help establish a high bidding floor early on in the
process.106 Moreover, debtors use the initial bid to lure other bidders into
the auction because later bidders can rely on the due diligence
conducted by the stalking horse. 107 Therefore, the initial bid may
ultimately attract higher subsequent bids during the auction process.108
The delicate nature of break-up fees in § 363 sales is due to the
competing interests present in bankruptcy. The overarching impediment
is that one side of the deal does not simply constitute the assets of a
seller, but rather, the assets of the estate of a debtor.109 The bankruptcy
court must approve any transaction outside the ordinary course of
business, which can make finalizing the sale precarious for all parties
involved.110 Here, the court must approve the break-up fee and terms of
102.
103.

See infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
See Hebbeln, supra note 13, at 478 (“The reasons that a bankrupt corporation
may want to enter into a break-up fee agreement are less obvious but no less
legitimate.”).
104. Id.
105. Contra Markell, supra note 15, at 360-63 (arguing that break-up fees are not
necessary to induce a healthy bidding process).
106. In re APP Plus, Inc., 223 B.R. 870, 874 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998).
107. See Hebbeln, supra note 13, at 478 (noting that once the initial bid has been
submitted, other bidders “may become more willing to enter the bidding process
because they can rely on the due diligence conducted by the initial bidder”).
108. See In re APP Plus, Inc., 223 B.R. at 874. (discussing the seller’s rationale in
requesting break-up and topping fees).
109. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012) (providing the DIP or the debtor’s trustee
with the power to “use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business,
property of the estate) (emphasis added).
110. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012) (requiring court approval of any transaction, sales or
leases outside of the ordinary course of business).
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the purchase agreement, but more importantly, the court must approve
the use of a § 363 sale by the debtor.111 In this regard, the court must
take into account not only the position of the stalking horse and the
debtor, but also the interests of the estate, which includes the interests of
the estate’s creditors. 112 Courts faced with the decision of whether to
approve a break-up fee have to weigh these interests when choosing
which standard of review to employ, as there is no explicit guidance in
the Bankruptcy Code. 113 Left to their own interpretations, courts in
different circuits have utilized varying standards of review based on
several rationales and factors. 114 Currently, the courts use three main
standards when deciding whether to authorize a break-up fee for a
stalking horse bidder: (1) the business judgment rule, (2) the best
interests of the estate test, and (3) the administrative expense standard.115
C. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
With break-up fees roots entrenched in corporate law, it is hardly
surprising that early bankruptcy courts looked to corporate law for
guidance as to how to review such fees.116 In a case of first impression,
In re 995 Fifth Avenue Associates, the Supreme Court determined that
the principles underlying the business judgment rule were appropriate in
the Chapter 11 context. 117 Accordingly, the Court followed the
traditional approach towards break-up fees in corporate law, using the
business judgment rule in combination with other factors to determine
the validity of the fee.118 The court noted that, in the corporate context,

111. See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp (In re Lionel Corp.), 722
F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that bankruptcy courts will require a “sound
business purpose” for the use of § 363, including a showing that a non-plan sale is
justified).
112. See Hebbeln, supra note 13, at 481.
113. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
114. See infra Part II.B.1-3.
115. See supra note 114.
116. See, e.g., In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 96 B.R. 24, 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(noting with respect to break-up fees, that corporate “principles have vitality by analogy
in the chapter 11 context”) (internal citations omitted).
117. Id. at 28.
118. See, e.g., Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 574-79 (11th Cir.
1988); CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 683 F.Supp. 422, 436-39 (S.D.N.Y.
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break-up fees are generally acceptable where they enhance, rather than
chill, bidding and are reasonable in relation to the bidder’s efforts and
magnitude of the transaction.119 Finding both of these prongs satisfied,
the Court determined that the business judgment rule encouraged the
Court to defer to the debtor’s business judgment as there was no
evidence of “self-dealing, fraud or bad faith . . . [n]or [was] any claim
made that the auction was somehow tainted by unfair dealing.”120
The business judgment standard, insofar as it relates to break-up
fees in bankruptcy, has been refined since In re 995 Fifth Avenue
Associates. 121 The touchstone case concerning use of the business
judgment rule to evaluate the validity of break-up fees in bankruptcy
comes from the Second Circuit.122 In In re Integrated Resources Inc., the
court, relying on prior district court decisions, formulated the modified
business judgment rule for assessing the validity of break-up fees,
asking: “whether (1) the negotiations leading to the break-up fee were
the result of an arms-length transaction, (2) the fee encourages bidding
and (3) the amount of the fee is reasonable in light of the prospective
purchase price.”123 Courts have altered the specific prongs of the test in
certain instances, but the guiding principle for the business judgment
approach remains constant: avoid interfering with a debtor’s business
decisions absent a clear manifestation of bad faith or breach of fiduciary
duty.124 Thus, courts that employ the business judgment standard are far

1988); Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 623-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
119. See In re 995 Fifth Ave Assocs., 96 B.R. at 28 (“In the corporate takeover
context it is recognized that breakup fees are not illegal where they enhance rather than
hamper the bidding. . . . When reasonable in relation to the bidder’s efforts and to the
magnitude of the transaction, breakup fees are generally permissible.”) (internal
citations omitted).
120. Id. at 28-29.
121. See infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
122. See In re Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
123. Kleiman, supra note 45, at 90 (citing In re Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R. at
658).
124. See, e.g., Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 574-75 (11th Cir.
1988) (noting that the business judgment rule “protects the defendants from liability
absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion”).
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more likely to award break-up fees for the stalking horse bidder than
courts using alternative standards.125
There are many courts and scholars that have criticized bankruptcy
courts’ use of the business judgment rule for break-up fees.126 Many of
these critics believe that a court’s primary goal when overseeing a
bankruptcy asset sale should be to maximize the value of the sale for the
benefit of the estate.127 This concern has led many to argue that courts
should not provide a debtor with the deference of the business judgment
rule because parties to a non-bankruptcy corporate combination are
unconcerned with the interests of creditors. 128 Those embracing this
school of thought believe that corporate standards are inappropriate for
assessing bid protection mechanisms in bankruptcy. 129 Instead, there
“should be an extra layer of consideration for the interests of creditors . .
. not present in a corporate transaction between two fully solvent
parties.”130
D. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ESTATE TEST
Instead of using the business judgment standard, some circuits have
refashioned their approach to draw on bankruptcy-inspired rules for the
125. Compare In re ASARCO LLC, 441 B.R. 813 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (approving a
break-up fee under the business judgment rule), aff’d sub nom. In re ASARCO, LLC,
650 F.3d 593 (5th Cir. 2011) and In re Metaldyne Corp., 409 B.R. 661 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2009) (same), with In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 F.3d 200 (3d
Cir. 2010) (holding that bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
break-up fee under the administrative expense standard), and In re Beth Israel Hosp.
Ass’n of Passaic, No. 06-16186, 2007 WL 2049881 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 12, 2007)
(denying the break-up fee under the administrative expense standard).
126. See, e.g., Markell, supra note 15, at 376 (noting that with respect to the use of
the business judgment rule in § 363 sales, “it makes little sense blindly to adopt
corporate rules for bankruptcy transactions”).
127. See, e.g., In re Atlanta Packaging Prods., Inc., 99 B.R. 124, 131 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1988) (“It is a well-established principle of bankruptcy law that the objective of
bankruptcy sales and the trustee’s duty with respect to such sales is to obtain the highest
price or greatest overall benefit possible for the estate.”).
128. See, e.g., Markell, supra note 15, at 376 (arguing against the use of the business
judgment rule for break-up fees in bankruptcy because, inter alia, “[t]he increased level
of protection for creditors’ priority claims gives rise to an increased level of obligation
and duty on the part of those who negotiate bankruptcy asset sales”).
129. Id.
130. See White, supra note 50, at 678.
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evaluation break-up fees.131 This prominent standard of review focuses
on the “best interests of the estate.”132 Courts applying the test do not
focus on “whether a breakup fee is within the business judgment of the
debtor, but whether the transaction will further the diverse interests of
the debtor, creditors and equity holders, alike.”133
Under the best interests of the estate test, courts use a broader
approach that focuses on whether the implementation of the break-up
fee maximizes the value of the sale for the estate’s creditors.134 While
courts consider different circumstances when employing the best
interests of the estate test, some factors that are generally considered are:
(1) whether the bid is higher than it would have been had the break-up
fee not been granted; (2) whether the break-up fee provided net value to
the estate; (3) whether a break-up fee is necessary to start the bidding
process; and (4) whether the amount of the break-up fee is small relative
to the overall benefit of the estate.135 Courts embracing the best interests
philosophy are willing to award break-up fees; however, many courts
using the best interests standard place a high burden on the stalking
horse bidder to validate the fee.136
Despite representing a middle ground between the business
judgment rule and the administrative expense standard, the best interests

131. See, e.g., In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. 98 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (“This
Court agrees with America West that the proper standard for evaluating a breakup fee
should be whether the interests of all concerned parties are best served by such a fee.
The test is whether the payment of a breakup fee is in the best interests of the estate.”).
132. Id. at 103.
133. Id. at 104-05 (internal quotations omitted).
134. See id. (noting that the question to consider when approving a break-up fee “is
not whether a break-up fee is within the business judgment of the debtor, but whether
the transaction will further the diverse interests of the debtor, creditors and equity
holders, alike”) (internal quotations omitted).
135. See In re Tama Beef Packing, Inc., 290 B.R. 90, 97 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003); In
re Tiara Motorcoach Corp., 212 B.R. 133, 137 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1997); In re Am. W.
Airlines Inc., 166 B.R. 908, 912-13 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
136. In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. at 105 (noting that, “absent compelling
circumstances which clearly indicate that payment of the fee would be in the best
interests of the estate, breakup fees should not be awarded in bankruptcy auction
sales”); see, e.g., In re Tiara Motorcoach, 212 B.R. at 137 (using the best interests of
the estate test and denying the stalking horse bidder’s request for a break-up fee); but
see In re Sea Island Co., 10-21034, 2010 WL 4393269 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2010)
(approving the break-up fee under the best interests of the estate test).
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of the estate test is not without its detractors. 137 Among the chief
concerns surrounding the best interests of the estate test is its fluidity.138
Although individual courts have articulated factors that they believe
should be considered in the analysis,139 there has been no version of the
test that provides finite elements by which judges can evaluate the
legitimacy of the fee request.140 Many critics argue that the discretion
afforded to bankruptcy judges by the best interests of the estate test
leads to inconsistent results.141
E. THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STANDARD—§ 503(b)
Notably, the Third Circuit is the only circuit in which a court of
appeals has addressed the issue of break-up fees for stalking horse
bidders.142 The court of appeals for the Third Circuit had the opportunity
to choose a side in the developing dichotomy of bankruptcy break-up
fee jurisprudence in the 1999 case, In re O’Brien Environmental Energy
Inc. 143 Instead of aligning with the pre-existing positions, the Third
Circuit decided that none of the case law advocating for use of the
business judgment standard or the best interests of the estate test
“offer[ed] a compelling justification for treating an application for
break-up fees and expenses under § 503(b) differently from other

137. See e.g., McGrath, supra note 7, part C (“[W]ithout some evidence that the
board has breached its duty to maximize the value of its bankruptcy estate a bankruptcy
court should review a presale request of a break-up fee under the well-established
modified business judgment standard.”).
138. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 4, at 1478 (“Although the In re Lionel Corp. court
pioneered the Best Interest Standard by instructing judges to consider the impact of the
break-up fee upon all stakeholders, it failed to provide judges with definite factors to
help guide judges in their evaluation.”).
139. See, e.g., In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992)
(listing seven factors to be used in the analysis).
140. See, e.g., In re Tiara Motorcoach, 212 B.R. at 137-38; In re Am. W. Airlines
Inc., 166 B.R. 908 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
141. See e.g., Brown, supra note 4, at 1477-84 (advocating for a change to the best
interests of the estate test that provides judges with specific factors to assess).
142. See Garza et al., supra note 42, at 7.
143. See Calpine Corp. v. O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc. (In re O’Brien Envtl.
Energy, Inc.), 181 F.3d 527, 533 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The bankruptcy courts and district
courts that have addressed the standard for break-up fees and expenses in bankruptcy
proceedings have adopted [two] very different approaches.”).
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applications for administrative expenses under the same provision.”144
The Court went on to conclude that “the determination whether break-up
fees or expenses are allowable under § 503(b) must be made in reference
to general administrative expense jurisprudence.”145
Under the administrative expense standard, a break-up fee is
justifiable (like other administrative expenses), if the requesting party
can show that the fees were “actual” and “necessary” to preserve the
value of the estate. 146 To assess whether the break-up satisfies this
standard, courts have considered two primary questions:147 (1) whether
the break-up fee was necessary to induce the stalking horse’s bid; and
(2) whether the break-up fee was necessary to preserve the stalking
horse’s bid at auction.148 In answering these questions, In re O’Brien and
its progeny have not been inclined to award break-up fees. 149 For
instance, in the recent case In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, the
court declined the stalking horse’s request for a break-up fee under the
administrative expense standard, despite the fact that the majority of
creditors and the “sole affected shareholder” of the debtor supported
approval of the break-up fee.150
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 535.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2012).
However, it should also be noted that some courts have fleshed out these two
factors further by listing specific criteria to be considered. This type of analysis is
sometimes referred to as the “multi-factor 503(b) standard.” See, e.g., In re Tama Beef
Packing, Inc., 290 B.R. 90, 97-98 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003) (recognizing nine factors to be
considered in the break-up fee analysis and denying the stalking horse’s request for a
break-up fee).
148. White, supra note 50, at 666 (citing In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594
F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2010)).
149. See, e.g., In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 F.3d at 210 (holding that
the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the break-up fee); In re
Tama Beef Packing, Inc., 290 B.R. 90 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003) (affirming the bankruptcy
court’s denial of the break-up fee); In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527 (3d
Cir. 1990) (affirming the district court’s decision to deny the break-up fee); In re Beth
Israel Hosp. Ass’n of Passaic, 06-16186 (NLW), 2007 WL 2049881 (Bankr. D.N.J. July
12, 2007) (denying the plaintiff’s request for a break-up fee).
150. In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 F.3d at 203, 209; see also In re Beth
Israel Hosp. Ass’n of Passaic, 06-16186 (NLW), 2007 WL 2049881 (Bankr. D.N.J. July
12, 2007) (noting that “the fact that the Debtor agreed to the break-up fee and thought
that it was reasonable and appropriate is not determinative of the allowance of such a
fee as an administrative expense”).
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The administrative expense standard’s hard stance towards
awarding break-up fees has been met with criticism, especially from
stalking horse bidders. At the outset, detractors believe that the
standard’s heightened scrutiny deters potential bidders from assuming
the role of the stalking horse.151 From a statutory perspective, those in
opposition to the administrative expense standard contend that break-up
fees are strikingly dissimilar from typical administrative expenses. 152
Indeed, some argue that break-up fees and § 503(b) administrative
expenses are distinguishable because administrative expenses are
supposed to be reimbursements or repayments to legislatively preferred
creditors, while break-up fees, in their truest form, are compensatory
sums that do not represent reimbursement for costs incurred.153 As such,
critics believe that § 503(b) is an inappropriate method of reviewing
break-up fees, as the statute only allows for “compensatory
reimbursement” under nine specific situations which focus on expenses
that are actual and necessary to preserving the value of the estate.154
F. THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY
The various approaches discussed above may each have advantages
and disadvantages depending on one’s view of break-up fees. What is
apparent from the analysis of the three approaches, however, is that the
outcome of the break-up fee approval determination is intrinsically
linked to which approach is taken by the court.155 A court’s decision to
151. See, e.g., Kleiman, supra note 45, at 89 (“[The administrative expense
standard] may deter potential [stalking horse] bidders from incurring the time and
expense needed to conduct due-diligence and prepare a bid for the asset.”).
152. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 4, at 1475 (“Break-up fees and § 503(b)
administrative expenses differ primarily in that administrative expenses are supposed to
be reimbursements or repayments to legislatively preferred and designated creditors,
while break-up fees are often excessive damages paid to outside and non-invested
bidders who lose a later auction or fail to consummate a purchase agreement for some
reason other than the fault of the stalking horse bidder.”).
153. Id.
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 503 (2012); Brown, supra note 4, at 1476.
155. Compare In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 1999)
(affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of a break-up fee under § 503), In re Reliant
Energy Channelview, LP, 403 B.R. 308 (D. Del. 2009) (same), aff’d sub nom. In re
Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 F.3d at 210 (3d Cir. 2010), and In re Pub. Serv.
Co. of New Hampshire, 160 B.R. 404 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993) (denying an unsuccessful
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use one approach over another can have a major effect on the ultimate
outcome of the § 363 sale, from both the debtor’s and the stalking
horse’s perspective.156 While some courts and scholars have argued that
break-up fees have no place in § 363 sales at all,157 the discussion that
follows will presume that, at least for the time being, stalking horse
bidders will be entitled to request approval of a break-up fee
arrangement. As such, courts must come to a consensus as to the
appropriate standard of review for break-up fees in bankruptcy.
The uncertainty surrounding break-up fees in § 363 sales can lead
to unpredictable results in Chapter 11 cases where potential stalking
horse bidders are unsure of whether the court will approve their request
for a fee.158 The differing standards encourage parties to forum shop;
specifically, they encourage potential purchasers to seek investment
opportunities in jurisdictions using the more lenient business judgment
bidder’s claim for a break-up fee under § 503), with In re Integrated Res., Inc., 135 B.R.
746, 753, aff’d 147 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s use of
the business judgment rule to approve a break-up fee), In re AmTrust Fin. Corp., 0921323, 2010 WL 4917553 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2010) (approving the break-up
fee where the fee “constituted a fair and reasonable exercise of the debtor’s business
judgment”), and In re ASARCO LLC, 441 B.R. 813 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (affirming the
bankruptcy court’s use of the business judgment rule to approve a break-up fee), aff’d
sub nom. In re ASARCO, LLC, 650 F.3d 593 (5th Cir. 2011).
156. Compare In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 1999)
(affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of a break-up fee under § 503), In re Reliant
Energy Channelview, LP, 403 B.R. at 312 (same), aff’d sub nom. In re Reliant Energy
Channelview LP, 594 F.3d at 200, and In re Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 160
B.R. 404 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993) (denying an unsuccessful bidder’s claim for a break-up
fee under § 503), with In re Integrated Res., Inc., 135 B.R. 746, 753 aff’d, 147 B.R. at
664 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s use of the business judgment
rule to approve a break-up fee), In re AmTrust Fin. Corp., 09-21323, 2010 WL
4917553 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2010) (approving the break-up fee where the fee
“constituted a fair and reasonable exercise of the debtor’s business judgment”), and In
re ASARCO LLC, 441 B.R. at 833 (affirming the bankruptcy court’s use of the business
judgment rule to approve a break-up fee), aff’d sub nom. In re ASARCO, LLC, 650 F.3d
at 603
157. See e.g., Markell, supra note 15, at 386; In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. 98, 104
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (noting that, “absent compelling circumstances which clearly
indicate that payment of the fee would be in the best interests of the estate, breakup fees
should not be awarded in bankruptcy auction sales”).
158. See Brown, supra note 4, at 1467 (“[T]he lack of a uniform standard leaves
stalking horse bidders guessing whether bankruptcy judges will approve or deny their
break-up fees . . . .”) (internal citation omitted).
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rule. 159 Furthermore, the task of soliciting a qualified initial bidder
seems daunting for a debtor that will not be able to speak definitively as
to what bidding incentives it can offer. 160 Similarly, stalking horse
bidders that have preliminarily agreed to submit a bid for assets in a §
363 sale will be wary of how many resources to commit to the process if
they are unsure of whether their rights to a break-up fee will be
upheld. 161 Ultimately, this confusion can lengthen § 363 sale
negotiations and detract from the value received for the assets.162
III. BALANCING THE APPROACH
Part II examined the three prominent approaches employed by
bankruptcy courts when reviewing break-up fee requests and
demonstrated the importance of establishing a uniform framework for
making such a determination. This Part argues in favor of using the best
interests of the estate test to determine whether to award break-up fees
to stalking horse bidders. The best interests of the estate test represents a
balanced approach implicated by the new role of § 363 sales in Chapter
11.
A. THE ROLE OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT IN CHAPTER 11
Adversary proceedings aside, a bankruptcy judge’s primary role is
to oversee the debtor’s estate and ensure that parties in interest comply
with the bankruptcy procedures.163 Instead of a universal approach, the
159. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases Is
Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts 13-16 (Univ. of Michigan Press 2006) (noting that
bankruptcy courts can and have solicited lucrative bankruptcy cases by using their
discretion to make their jurisdiction appear more favorable for corporate bankruptcy
filings).
160. See Hebbeln, supra note 13, at 505 (advocating for a uniform amendment to
the Bankruptcy Code because “[p]arties” to break-up fee arrangements [in most
bankruptcy courts] cannot know which line of reasoning their court will adopt” with
respect to break-up fees).
161. Markell, supra note 15, at 375 (noting that stalking horse bidders anticipating
strict review of their purchase agreement will lower their bid accordingly to compensate
for the risk of losing the break-up fee).
162. See id.
163. Bruce M. Price, Halting, Altering and Agreeing, 38 S.U. L. Rev. 233, 243-44
(2011) (“[T]he role of the judge in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case differs markedly from
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Bankruptcy Code sets forth various frameworks for courts to employ
depending on the type of case before the court.164 It seems unlikely that
Congress would have fashioned alternative methods by which a debtor
could enter bankruptcy if Congress did not in fact wish to differentiate
the role of the bankruptcy court in each proceeding.165 It follows that a
consideration of the level of scrutiny warranted by break-up fees
necessarily entails an assessment of the role of the bankruptcy court in a
Chapter 11 case.
Generally, a debtor remains in control of its operations as a
“debtor-in-possession” (“DIP”) in Chapter 11 cases.166 Unlike Chapter 7
where a trustee is automatically appointed,167 a bankruptcy judge will
only appoint a trustee in a Chapter 11 case when a party in interest can
demonstrate a need for one.168 An analysis of the legislative history of
Chapter 11 “explains that the primary reason for leaving the debtor in
possession is that the continuation of experienced management will
benefit both debtors and creditors by leading to a greater likelihood of
successful reorganization.”169 The appointment of a trustee, on the other
hand, may delay and hinder the Chapter 11 process due to the trustee’s
lack of familiarity with the debtor’s business. 170 Accordingly, reasons

that of a judge in an adversarial civil proceeding. Unlike all other forms of adversarial
jurisprudence, the judge’s essential role is not to decide between competing claims of
litigants. Rather, the judge oversees the process and makes sure that the parties comply
with the rules.”).
164. For instance, the Bankruptcy Code uses Chapter 7 for debtor liquidations,
Chapter 11 for debtor reorganizations, and Chapter 13 for consumer debt readjustments.
165. See In re Crouse, 9 B.R. 400, 402 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981) (“The intent of the
drafters of the Code was to provide similar approaches for all types of cases except
where obviously inappropriate, for example rehabilitation versus liquidation.”).
166. See John T. Roache, The Fiduciary Obligations of a Debtor in Possession,
1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 133, 138 (1993) (“In most cases, the debtor remains in control of
the estates as DIP.”).
167. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-03 (2012).
168. See Roache, supra note 166, at 138 (“In Chapter 11 . . . a court appoints a
trustee only when the need for one can be demonstrated.”).
169. See id. at 152
170. See In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 B.R. 781, 785-86 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(noting that appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 case is an “extraordinary remedy”
because such action “will generally necessitate the [displacement] of the current
experienced management with those probably less familiar with the field at a time when
the enterprise itself is usually tottering on the brink of financial collapse”).
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for leaving a debtor in a position of control in Chapter 11 coincide with
its statutory purpose: rehabilitation of the debtor’s business.171
In keeping with the theme of rehabilitation, another statutory aim
for Chapter 11 was to limit the judge’s discretion in oversight over the
case where Congress assumed that the debtor would re-emerge after the
bankruptcy.172 As such, bankruptcy courts typically scrutinize a Chapter
11 DIP’s actions under the business judgment rule.173 In the corporate
context, the guiding view is that it is more appropriate for executives
and directors to make business decisions than the courts. 174 It is no
surprise, therefore, that bankruptcy courts rarely hesitate to defer to the
DIP’s judgment concerning transactional matters in Chapter 11 cases.175
B. THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE TEST GOES TOO FAR
The bankruptcy court’s more limited role in the Chapter 11 process
provides credence for the argument against using the administrative
expense test to evaluate break-up fees in § 363 sales. 176 The
171. C-TC 9th Ave, P’ship v. Norton Co. ( In re C-TC 9th Ave. P’ship), 113 F.3d
1304, 1310 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he purpose of Chapter 11 reorganization is to assist
financially distressed business enterprises by providing them with breathing space in
which to return to a viable state.”) (internal quotations omitted).
172. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 729, 746
(1993) (“One of the key concepts behind Chapter 11 was to remove bankruptcy judges
from the administration of bankruptcy cases and permit them to act solely in a judicial
capacity.”).
173. See, e.g., COR Route 5 Co., LLC v. The Penn Traffic Co. (In re Penn Traffic
Co.), 524 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2009); Covey v. Soy Capital Bank and Trust Company (In re T.A.
Brinkoetter & Sons, Inc.), No. 09-80727, 2012 WL 1865485 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. May 22,
2012).
174. See, e.g., In re Lyon & Reboli, Inc., 24 B.R. 152 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(“[D]isagreements over business policy are not amenable to judicial resolution. The
courtroom is not a boardroom. The judge is not a business consultant.”) (internal
quotations omitted).
175. See e.g., In re Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd., 509 B.R. 455, 463 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“A court will generally not second-guess a debtor’s business judgment
regarding whether the assumption or rejection of a contract will benefit the debtor’s
estate.”); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 60 B.R. 612, 615-16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(“[T]he Code favors the continued operation of a business by a debtor and a
presumption of reasonableness attaches to a debtor’s management decisions.”).
176. See Part III.A.
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administrative expense test is inherently an ex-post facto method of
review.177 To decide whether to approve a payment as an administrative
expense, the bankruptcy court must use hindsight to assess whether the
expense was “actual” and “necessary” to preserve the value of the
estate. 178 Notably, the issue before the court in In re O’Brien was
whether or not to approve a post-sale petition for a break-up fee, as
opposed to the typical scenario in which a break-up fee is considered
prior to the sale.179 Therefore, the Third Circuit was not truly evaluating
the merits of a break-up fee provision.180 Rather, the Court was really
reviewing a claimant’s § 503(b) request for fees that happened to arise
out of a break-up fee agreement. 181 Unlike complex financial
transactions, payment of an administrative claim is a feature of
bankruptcy law that comes within the ken of the bankruptcy court, not
the business executives of the debtor.182 Thus, under the circumstances,
the court was within its bounds to assess whether that particular request
for a break-up fee was reasonable under § 503.183
In practice, however, most bankruptcy courts deal with pre-sale
approval of break-up fee provisions. 184 Therefore, most § 363 sales
require bankruptcy courts to consider the merits of a break-up fee prior

177. Kevin M. Baum, It’s Not About Breaking Up: A Contract-Consideration Based
“Dowry” as an Alternative to Breakup Fees in Bankruptcy, 2012 Ann. Surv. of Bankr.
Law 11, part C, 1 (2012) (noting that the administrative expense test requires the court
to use “hindsight”).
178. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2012).
179. In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527, 530 (3d Cir. 1999).
180. See White, supra note 50, at 680-81 (arguing that “because Reliant concerned a
pre-auction break-up fee request, Section 503 and O’Brien were inapplicable”).
181. Garza et al., supra note 42, at 10-11 (arguing that the O’Brien court was really
adjudicating a “request by an alleged administrative claimant asserting the right to
payment under section 503(b)”).
182. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(a) (2012); see also Garza et al., supra note 42, at 10
(commenting that under the factual circumstances of the O’Brien case, “the Third
Circuit’s ruling that Calpine’s request should be governed by section 503(b) rather than
section 363(b)(1) is understandable and most likely correct”).
183. See supra notes 180-81.
184. See Garza et al., supra note 42, at 10 (citing Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y.
Waisman, Asset Sales & Auctions: A Primer, 826 Comm. Law & Prac. Practice Guide
Handbook Series 105, 162 (2001)).
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to the actual auction.185 As one commentator has succinctly stated: “[i]n
order to apply the section 503(b) standard to a presale break-up fee, a
court would have to make a determination as to whether the fee is actual
and necessary to preserve the value of the estate, without having seen
the actual outcome of the bidding process.”186 Practically speaking, it is
quite difficult for a court to determine the necessity of a break-up fee
prior to observing its effects.187 That is to say, a debtor will not be able
to know if stipulating to a break-up fee with the stalking horse bidder
was beneficial until after the sale is consummated. 188 Therefore, the
decision to utilize a break-up fee as a bidding incentive is more of a
business issue than a typical bankruptcy procedure.189 Consequently, it is
a concern that should be dealt with, at least in part, by relying on the
business acumen of the Chapter 11 debtor.
C. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IS INAPT BECAUSE § 363 SALES ARE
DISTINCT FROM NON-DISTRESSED SALES
The transactional aspect of break-up fees within § 363 sales, insofar
as it relates to the competing judgments of the bankruptcy court and the
debtor, indicates that the administrative expense test is unsuitable for
determining whether to award break-up fees to stalking horse bidders.190
Simply put, the administrative expense test affords the court too much

185. See Garza et al., supra note 42, at 10 (noting that a “typical” 363 sale consists
of the stalking horse or debtor seeking approval of the proposed break-up fee prior to
the auction).
186. McGrath, supra note 7, n.193-94 and accompanying text.
187. Id. at n.193-94 and accompanying text (concluding that “using the O’Brien
section 503(b) administrative expense test to determine whether a presale break-up fee
should be allowed is not only impractical, it is impossible”).
188. See McGrath, supra note 7, at n.193-94 and accompanying text (“Courts should
not be able to determine whether a break-up fee is ‘actual and necessary’ unless there
has been an auction with which the court can determine whether the fee was actual and
necessary.”).
189. See McGrath, supra note 7, at n.214-15 and accompanying text (“Break-up fees
only come into existence as part of a section 363 sale and are never seen in any other
context in bankruptcy.”).
190. See Part III.A (explaining that the administrative expense test is unsuitable for
review of break-up fees because it is an ex-post test, whereas break-up fee approvals are
typically requested prior to auction, and have more characteristics of a business
decision than a bankruptcy procedure).
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control in an area that is best left in the hands of the debtor.191 This is not
to say, however, that the debtor should be entitled to the deference
afforded by the business judgment rule when deciding whether to
include a break-up fee provision into a purchase agreement in a § 363
sale. Instead, courts should consider, but not blindly follow the debtor’s
judgment because § 363 sales are distinct from non-distressed asset
sales.192
A comparative analysis of healthy versus distressed asset sales
indicates that the two processes are far too different to defer to the
business judgment of the debtor in the latter case.193 In healthy corporate
combinations, whether or not by auction, the management’s
responsibility is to produce the best return for the shareholders. 194
Consequently, in the non-distressed situation the business’s management
constructs a deal that ultimately affects the potential profits earned by
the shareholders. 195 Whether or not a shareholder profits from its
ownership stake in a company is a risk intrinsically linked to the
shareholder’s investment in that company.196 Therefore, the margin for
error afforded to a corporation’s management in a healthy asset sale
correlates to the investment risk contemplated by the corporation’s
shareholders. 197 On the other hand, a DIP’s duty is to the estate’s

191.
192.

See McGrath, supra note 7, n.190.
See In re Tiara Motorcoach Corp., 212 B.R. 133, 137 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1997)
(“A sale pursuant to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code is not in the ordinary course of
business, and the business judgment of the debtor should not be solely relied upon.
Rather, a court should insure that revenues are maximized and that the best interests of
the debtor’s estate, creditors and equity holders are furthered.”).
193. See Markell, supra note 15, at 376 (arguing that “it makes little sense blindly to
adopt corporate rules for bankruptcy transactions”).
194. See id. at 372 (stating that, in the corporate context, “[e]ven if an auction duty
is applicable, [management must] conduct a fair process designed to yield the best price
for the shareholders”).
195. See id. at 376 (noting that in corporate combinations “[e]very marginal dollar
gained or lost through the use of breakup fees is just another dollar, more or less, of the
shareholders’ profit”).
196. See id. at 376 (“The inability of management to maximize [company] profit
due to bad business decisions is just one of the risks that shareholders assume when
they invest.”).
197. Id.
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creditors. 198 The return reaped by a § 363 sale is not profit for the
creditors, it is recompense.199 Accordingly, the methods used by a DIP’s
management to consummate a § 363 sale must be limited because the
beneficiaries of the sale, the creditors, are concerned with
reimbursement, not reward. 200 Courts reviewing healthy corporate
combinations have increased their level of scrutiny for break-up fees,
despite their steadfast use of the business judgment rule for broad
review of the entire transaction.201 It stands to reason that the divergent
interests present in a Chapter 11 case merit a similar, if not greater,
increase in the level of scrutiny applied towards break-up fees in § 363
sales.
D. THE NON-PLAN LIQUIDATION ASPECT OF § 363 JUSTIFIES THE USE OF
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ESTATE TEST
The absence of extra protection for the estate’s creditors inherent in
the business judgment rule is particularly concerning due to the
tendency for § 363 sales to become non-plan liquidations of

198. See In re Grabill Corp., 113 B.R. 966, 970 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (“A Chapter
11 debtor-in-possession administers the assets of the estate and any business conducted
therein, as a fiduciary for both the equity interests and creditors.”) (internal citations
omitted).
199. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (defining creditor as, inter alia, an “entity that has a claim
against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the
debtor”). It is important to note that debts are generally incurred by the parties to a
healthy business relationship, thus the cash generated by a § 363 sale goes toward the
creditor’s predetermined remuneration, not toward an additional return on the creditor’s
investment.
200. See In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc., 240 F.3d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 2001)
(commenting that, “shareholders expect to take more risk than creditors in return for the
right to participate in firm profits. The creditor only expects repayment of a fixed
debt”); see also Markell, supra note 15, at 374 (“Since creditors often face a loss even
in the best of bankruptcies, bankruptcy sales are supposed to yield the best deal that will
result in distributable dividends to unpaid creditors.”).
201. See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 683 F.Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (noting in its analysis that break-up fees in corporate combinations “are not
illegal where they enhance rather than chill bidding”); see also Samjens Partners I v.
Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F.Supp. 614, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“In coordinating the
bidding process, the board can institute strategies, such as . . . a break-up fee . . . but
only if their strategies enhance the bidding.”).
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substantially all of the debtor’s assets.202 Although Chapter 11 provides
debtors with the opportunity to sell assets, that feature is typically in
consideration of the debtor’s re-emergence as a going concern after the
bankruptcy.203 In essence, § 363 sales have become a backdoor way for
debtors to completely liquidate without going through the traditional
Chapter 7 process.204 Whether or not a break-up fee ultimately increases
the price received for the liquidation sale, 205 the break-up fee does
nominally reduce the net return on the assets and therefore, the value for
the estate. 206 For that reason, when the debtor’s focus shifts from
rehabilitation to liquidation, the bankruptcy court’s focus must shift
from preserving the debtor’s business as a going concern to securing the
greatest distribution for the debtor’s creditors. 207 As a corollary, this
shift in focus requires a heightened level of scrutiny for the award of
break-up fees.208
From a policy standpoint, it seems that the court’s role in the § 363
process should mirror that of the heightened supervision of Chapter 7.209
Yet, that position does not take into account the benefits of the debtor’s

202.
203.

See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (noting this trend).
See In re Bombay Co., Inc., 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 2826071 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2007) (noting that, “chapter “is not intended principally as a vehicle
for sales of virtually all estate property under § 363(b)(1) . . . The court would infinitely
prefer that a chapter 11 case be resolved through the plan process”) (internal citations
omitted).
204. See Rose, supra note 27, at 259 (noting that the sale of the debtor’s entire
business was neither intended nor contemplated by the drafters of § 363) (internal
citations omitted).
205. See Markell, supra note 15, at 360-69 (debating this point).
206. The break-up fee lowers the net return on the sale of assets because it is
deducted from the proceeds of the sale.
207. Jessica Uziel, Section 363(b) Restructuring Meets the Sound Business Purpose
Test with Bite: An Opportunity to Rebalance the Competing Interests of Bankruptcy
Law, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1189, 1197 (2011) (noting that the § 363 sales must be
scrutinized more closely than traditional Chapter 11 sales because of the process’s
potential to “deviate from several goals of bankruptcy law” such as “securing equal
distribution among creditors of the same class”).
208. Cf. id.
209. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (outlining the duties of the trustee and
highlighting the necessity for court approval for the trustee’s actions), with notes supra
169-171 and accompanying text.
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familiarity with its own business.210 Nonetheless, the court must provide
heightened scrutiny for unique circumstances in § 363 sales, such as
break-up fees, where creditors are not afforded the protections typical to
an asset sale under a plan of reorganization.211 Most notably, creditors
must approve sales conducted pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan via the
confirmation process. 212 In that regard, the onus is on the debtor’s
management to formulate a suitable plan. On the other hand, once a
court allows a debtor to proceed with a non-plan sale, § 363’s notice and
hearing requirements put the burden on the estate’s creditors to object.213
In short, plan confirmation is conditioned upon creditor approval,
whereas § 363 sale approval depends on the creditors’ inability or
failure to object.214 This is particularly troubling given § 363 sales’ nonspecific notice provision, which merely requires the debtor to give
notice “as is appropriate in the particular circumstances.” 215 Unlike a
plan sale’s formal disclosure obligations, 216 § 363’s relaxed notice
requirement weakens creditors ability to both understand and object to
the sale.217

210. See Rose, supra note 27, at 259 (noting that the Chapter 11 DIP’s “[p]reexisting business relationships and industry expertise are generally seen as tools to
maximize the estate value, especially when compared to the options of distressed sales
or public auctions by a trustee in Chapter 7”).
211. See In re Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 85, 88 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988)
(noting that the Court had a responsibility to review this proposed § 363 sale carefully
because, inter alia, “the sale will liquidate a substantial asset of Debtor; and the sale is a
preconfirmation sale controlled by the Debtor in Chapter 11, rather than a sale within a
Chapter 7 case where a disinterested trustee controls the proposed liquidation of
assets”).
212. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(c) and 1129 (2012).
213. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1); Rose, supra note 27, at 260 (noting that “the onus
for objecting to a § 363(b) transaction is borne by the objecting party”).
214. Rose, supra note 27, at 262; compare 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)-(8) (2012)
(stating that the court can only confirm a plan of reorganization if, inter alia, each
holder of a claim or interest has accepted the plan), with 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012)
(stating that “[t]he trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than
in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate”).
215. 11 U.S.C. § 102(1)(A) (2012).
216. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2012).
217. See Rose, supra note 27, at 259 (“With a § 363 sale, fewer people receive less
information, and the lack of a disclosure requirement weakens creditor leverage when
compared with what leverage they may have had with Chapter 11 plan confirmation.”).
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Ironically, bankruptcy courts were tasked with weighing similar
conflicting interests when they first faced the issue of whether to
approve § 363 sales for debtors who intended to sell the majority or all
of their assets.218 Although commonplace now, bankruptcy courts were
initially hesitant to allow debtors to use § 363 in a way that would
effectively circumvent the plan process.219 The standard used today, the
“sound business purpose” test, 220 was first articulated in the Second
Circuit case In re Lionel Corporation. 221 Reviewing a § 363 sale of
substantially all of the debtor’s assets, the Court had to determine
whether the proposed sale, although applied for by the debtor and
supported by the creditor’s committee, was valid under Chapter 11
where it faced legitimate objection by the debtor’s equity
shareholders.222 Instead of simply relying on the business judgment rule,
the court established that the business justification required to warrant a
§ 363 sale must ultimately take into account the interests of the estate.223

218. See In re White Motor Credit Corp., 14 B.R. 584 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981)
(arguing that selling substantially all of the debtor’s assets via 363 “side-steps the
procedural and substantive provisions of Chapter 11 itself, including the disclosure
statement, vote and confirmation standards”) (internal citations omitted).
219. Id. at 590 (holding that “Section 363(b) does not authorize sale of all or
substantially all assets of the estate”).
220. In re Titusville Country Club, 128 B.R. 396, 399 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991).
221. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The rule we adopt
requires that a judge determining a § 363(b) application expressly find from the
evidence presented before him at the hearing a good business reason to grant such an
application.”).
222. See id. at 1066 (“The Committee of Equity Security Holders . . . appealed this
order claiming that the sale, prior to approval of a reorganization plan, deprives the
equity holders of the Bankruptcy Code’s safeguards of disclosure, solicitation and
acceptance and divests the debtor of a dominant and profitable asset which could serve
as a cornerstone for a sound plan. . . .The Creditors’ Committee favors the sale because
it believes it is in the best interests of Lionel and because the sale is expressly
authorized by § 363(b) of the Code. [The Debtor] tells us that . . . [the] sale will provide
the estate with the large block of the cash needed to fund its plan of reorganization.”).
223. Id. at 1071 (“In fashioning its findings, a bankruptcy judge must not blindly
follow the hue and cry of the most vocal special interest groups; rather, he should
consider all salient factors pertaining to the proceeding and, accordingly, act to further
the diverse interests of the debtor, creditors and equity holders, alike.”); see Uziel,
supra note 207, at 1200 (“In determining that the ‘appeasement of major creditors’
alone does not constitute a good business reason for judicial approval of a § 363 sale,
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Similar to the sound business purpose test, the best interests of the
estate test considers the business judgment of the debtor while adding an
additional level of protection for the interests of the estate.224 To achieve
this effect, the best interests test allows the bankruptcy court to consider
both the procedural and substantive validity of the proposed break-up
fee. 225 Procedurally, the test first confirms that the debtor made an
appropriate business decision when negotiating the break-up fee.226 This
ensures that the experienced judgment of the debtor is not overlooked in
the § 363 process, which is fundamentally a business transaction.227 The
the Second Circuit implied that the business justification in the bankruptcy context must
take into account equity and creditor interests, in addition to the business’s interests.”).
224. Compare In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1071 (describing relevant factors of
the sound business purpose test to be: “the proportionate value of the asset to the estate
as a whole, the amount of elapsed time since the filing, the likelihood that a plan of
reorganization will be proposed and confirmed in the near future, the effect of the
proposed disposition on future plans of reorganization, the proceeds to be obtained from
the disposition vis-a-vis any appraisals of the property, which of the alternatives of use,
sale or lease the proposal envisions and whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in
value”), with In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992)
(describing the relevant factors to be considered using the best interests of the estate test
as: “Whether the fee requested correlates with a maximization of value to the debtor’s
estate; Whether the underlying negotiated agreement is an arms-length transaction
between the debtor’s estate and the negotiating acquirer; Whether the principal secured
creditors and the official creditors committee are supportive of the concession; Whether
the subject break-up fee constitutes a fair and reasonable percentage of the proposed
purchase price; Whether the dollar amount of the break-up fee is so substantial that it
provides a “chilling effect” on other potential bidders; The existence of available
safeguards beneficial to the debtor’s estate; Whether there exists a substantial adverse
impact upon unsecured creditors, where such creditors are in opposition to the break-up
fee”) (emphasis added).
225. See In re Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. 908, 912 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994)
(explaining that the best interests of the estate test includes “a determination that all
aspects of the transaction are in the best interests of all concerned”).
226. See, e.g., In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. at 194 (noting at the outset of its
analysis of whether to award the bidder’s request for a break-up fee that the fee was
negotiated as part of an “arms-length” transaction and constituted a fair and reasonable
fee with respect to the magnitude of the transaction).
227. See, e.g., In re Sea Island Co., 10-21034, 2010 WL 4393269 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
Sept. 15, 2010) (approving the fee, inter alia, because “the record establish[ed] that [the
sale] was an arms-length transaction, given the lengthy negotiations between multiple
parties over the terms and amount of the break-up fee from at least the second round of
the process”).
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best interests test, however, goes one step further by reviewing the
substance of the transaction to confirm that the break-up fee has or will
improve the outcome of the § 363 sale. 228 This additional safeguard
helps to realign the § 363 sale towards its fundamental purpose of
generating value for the estate’s creditors.229
CONCLUSION
The best interests of the estate test constitutes the appropriate level
of scrutiny for break-up fees § 363 sales. The administrative expense
test ignores the business expertise of the debtor and makes it
exceedingly difficult for courts to award break-up fees to stalking horse
bidders that take on the risk of purchasing distressed assets via public
auction. On the other end of the spectrum, the deference required by the
business judgment rule, if applied to the debtor’s acquiescence to a
break-up fee, 230 would “straightjacket the bankruptcy judge so as to
prevent him from doing what is best for the estate.” 231 By reviewing
break-up fees under the best interests of the estate test, bankruptcy
courts are able to shield creditors from undue harm to the estate while
providing financially sophisticated debtors with a swift process by
which to liquidate assets. Using the best interests of the estate test for
break-up fees provides courts with the heightened control over § 363
sales implicated by the provision’s role in modern Chapter 11
bankruptcy. If applied consistently throughout bankruptcy courts, the
best interests of the estate test will provide the appropriate level of
protection for Chapter 11 creditors and will help guide debtors and
stalking horse bidders towards consummating efficient and fair § 363
sales.

228. See In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. at 195-96 (explaining that the court
denied the break-up fee because, although it appeared reasonable and was fairly
negotiated, the provision was non-contingent. As such, the fee was “an unwarranted
expense upon the Debtor’s estate”).
229. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
230. See supra Part II.B (indicating that it is most likely the situation that a stalking
horse bidder would request the break-up fee and the debtor would agree to it, not vice
versa).
231. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983).

